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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE III

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 27 August 1990, at 4 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. YAMADA (Japan)

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languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in
a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this
document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des
Nations, Geneva.

The meeting was called to order at 4.25 p.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13):

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY:

- (1) ARTICLES IV AND III (3), PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE III (1, 2, 4) AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 AS WELL AS TO ARTICLES I AND II
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ROLE OF THE TREATY IN THE PROMOTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND IN STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (agenda item 14):

- A. ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY BY STATES
- B. MEASURES AIMED AT PROMOTING A WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY

The CHAIRMAN welcomed members and said that the Committee's terms of reference had been worked out by the Preparatory Committee and adopted by the Conference. The primary task was to review the implementation of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of use of nuclear energy and included article IV and article III (3) and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs, especially in their relationship to article III (1, 2, 4) and the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, as well as to articles I, II and V. The Committee shared with Main Committee II the review of agenda item 14 and there might be some overlap because of the links between international co-operation and the non-proliferation assurances through safeguards. Close contact would be maintained with Main Committee II in order to avoid any duplication of work.

The documents before the Committee included one on basic facts within the framework of United Nations in connection with the realization of the purposes of articles IV and V (NPT/CONF.IV/4), the statement by the Non-Aligned and Other States (NPT/CONF.IV/30), and two background papers by the IAEA (NPT/CONF.IV/13 and 14). Parts of the papers provided by the depositaries were also relevant (NPT/CONF.IV/19, 20 and 21), as well as parts of the memorandum from the five Nordic countries (NPT/CONF.IV/18).

He suggested that the Committee should limit the debate to two meetings and devote the remainder of the available time to the drafting exercise, while allowing delegations to make statements at a later stage.

Mr. WAGNER (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) said that his country had acceded to the NPT from the very beginning and had a long tradition in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as a non-nuclear-weapon Party. The practical results of the implementation of the NPT had proved its validity and justified extending it beyond the year 1995.

At present, his country operated eight 440 MW light water reactor units supplying about 28 per cent of total electricity production. Four additional 440 MW and two 1,000 MW units were under construction. All the reactors were of USSR design. Recent political and economic developments had resulted in a change from a unilateral USSR orientation to broader co-operation with advanced partners all over the world and, in that new orientation, strong emphasis was being laid on increasing operational safety. His delegation welcomed the fact that the NPT did not impose limitations on efforts to foster peaceful uses of nuclear energy in international co-operation.

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic's activities in relation to article IV was concerned more particularly with developing and increasing the level of nuclear safety and radiological protection. Hence it wholeheartedly supported the efforts of the IAEA and recommended greater activity and universal adherence to improved and internationally recognized standards for the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, including all aspects of management and disposal of radioactive wastes. Examples of active co-operation in that field included the invitation to the IAEA's OSART mission to the Dukovany nuclear power plant (NPP) in 1989, the invitation to the IAEA's ASSET mission to the Jaskovské Bohumice V-1 NPP and the invitation to the IAEA's pre-OSART missions to the Telemelin NPP site in 1990.

His country's accession in 1987 to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident had also helped to strengthen nuclear safety and radiological protection. It had concluded bilateral agreements in the matter with Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany and Hungary, and had been a member of the IAEA's IRS system since 1985. It had also played an active role in the Council of Regulatory Bodies established among WWER-type reactor-operating countries.

His delegation supported the efforts of IAEA to ensure long-term forecasts of nuclear material and equipment supplies with effective assurances of non-proliferation. The area was one in which a successful solution had yet

to be arrived at. The IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) had prepared a number of basic documents presenting some recommendations. The main task of the CAS, namely the formulation of principles for the assurance of supplies, had not yet been completely fulfilled. He therefore recommended that CAS should resume its activity and seek for new solutions.

The technical assistance and co-operation programmes organized within the framework of the IAEA and referred to in article IV were important. By the agreement on technical assistance concluded with the IAEA, his Government had undertaken to utilize the accepted assistance exclusively for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Actually, his country not only accepted but also offered technical assistance and Czechoslovak experts were sent to developing countries to organize education and training; specialized IAEA education and training courses were also held in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic itself. His country's total contribution since the Third Review Conference to the IAEA technical assistance budget amounted approximately to 17 million crowns.

Other examples of active international co-operation could be cited, such as the Arrangement between the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission (CSAEC) and the United States for the exchange of technical information and co-operation in nuclear safety matters, concluded in 1989. A similar agreement had been reached that same year with France on the exchange of technical information related to nuclear safety inspection activities and co-operation in the elaboration of a set of principles on nuclear safety. Co-operation with Japan in the same field went back to 1986.

Two other agreements were in preparation, one with the Government of the United States and another with the Government of Canada on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Co-operation in the same field with the USSR and the CMEA member countries was still good.

All those examples showed that the NPT provided a firm world-wide basis for useful co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without any discrimination or limitation on development in the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that it afforded assurances of compliance with the non-proliferation undertakings referred to in articles I and II. For that reason, his delegation supported all efforts to keep the Treaty in force without any revision and to achieve universal accession to it.

Mr. ANGUIANO (Mexico) said that the Committee was called upon to evaluate the events which have occurred since the Third Review Conference with respect to articles IV and V and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs of the NPT, and to put forward fair, objective and realistic conclusions and recommendations. The Committee should not confine its work to bringing up to date the wording of the 26 paragraphs on international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which had been included in the 1985 Final Declaration. In its discussion on the extent of progress or regression with respect to such co-operation, the Committee could rely on the experience of the parties to the NPT. It would also find useful guidance in such documents as the valuable IAEA papers (NPT/CONF.IV/13 and 14) and the most recent papers of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation.

There was an obvious concern on the part of a considerable number of States Parties about the genuine application and fulfilment of the provisions of the NPT on nuclear co-operation for peaceful purposes. There was dissatisfaction at the restrictions that still existed with regard to the exchange of equipment, materials and knowledge of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes among the Parties. There was also dissatisfaction at the limited access of developing countries to that area.

At the same time, some of the limitations and restrictions observed in 1985 had decreased in recent years as a result of a number of factors which had altered the pattern of the world market for nuclear resources for peaceful purposes. The concern with the security and the reliability of nuclear reactors had greatly increased following the Chernobyl accident and in some developed countries there was a slow down - or even scrapping - of some programmes for the production of electricity with nuclear energy. The high cost of projects of that kind and the absence of international financing had deterred many developing countries from expanding their nuclear energy programmes.

It followed that there was now an excess supply of nuclear-source electric energy in the international market. World demand for new reactors was practically at a standstill and only 96 units had been under construction at the end of 1989. Between 1985 and 1989 the design capacity of nuclear power stations had grown only by 20 per cent and, at the outset of the present decade, nuclear energy accounted for less than 17 per cent of world

electricity production when some 10 years before it had been forecast that at least one-fifth of total electricity would be of nuclear origin. Accordingly, the countries that were the traditional suppliers of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, and the new suppliers which had emerged, had a large part of their production and export capacity lying idle. Most of them were competing for maintenance contracts and the sale of spare parts for stations already in operation. As a result, transfers of nuclear technology and materials for the few remaining users in the market had become more flexible. That development did not reflect any real change of attitude and was simply due to the market situation.

To state the position more precisely, the analyses made by the IAEA (NPT/CONF.IV/13, annexes II.A and II.B) showed that the international market was clearly a "buyer's market" with ample possibilities for diversification in supplies. Although no major changes had been recorded in the export policies of the suppliers, including restrictions on the export of "sensitive technologies" and constraints with discriminatory elements, a distinct flexibility was apparent in the application of constraints, especially with regard to the so-called "prior consent rights".

He had in mind the supply of nuclear plants and equipment, uranium, initial and back-end fuel cycle services, complete fuel supply and technological and operational support. In all those spheres of the peaceful nuclear industry, there had been fewer cases of restriction and since 1980 there had been no cases of interruption of supplies to buyer countries bound by safeguard agreements. Those developments had been the result of adverse economic conditions in many countries which had been obliged to reduce their productive capacity in the past decade. Suppliers had thus been able to leave part of their productive capacity idle. Another factor was the emergence of new suppliers of nuclear plants, equipment and materials.

It was in that area that the contradictions between non-proliferation and nuclear development for peaceful purposes became evident. In view of the dynamics of nuclear research and nuclear industries in threshold countries which were not States Parties to the Treaty but had mostly established safeguards agreements with the IAEA, there were countries which felt restricted and discriminated against in regard to access to equipment, materials and technology which might obviously serve a dual purpose - for peaceful or warlike purposes. Consequently, in discussions in such forums as

the Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, three threshold developing countries had assumed a leadership role in discussing with the industrialized countries their over-emphasis on a close tie between non-proliferation commitments and the right to unrestricted access to technologies. Mexico, as a State Party both to the NPT and to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was on a number of occasions the object of discrimination because it was subjected to restrictions on access to advanced nuclear technology, yet observed that, as a result of economic interests, private enterprises of developed countries whose Governments had declared that they were against the proliferation of sensitive technology none the less enabled strategic supplies to reach countries which were not subject to international safeguards of any type. Such contradictions and inequitable treatment would come to an end only when the NPT moved towards a total ban on nuclear-weapon testing and towards general disarmament.

Various developments indicated that there had been significant changes in the world energy market. Among them was the need of several developing countries to step up their electrification programmes based on fossil fuels, which would certainly affect the world environment through the increase in carbon dioxide and other similar gases and would have repercussions on the public concept of the risks and advantages of using nuclear energy to obtain electricity. The emergence of new technologies to reduce the costs of nuclear energy would also bring about changes in energy policies. Again, progress in the application of nuclear resources for purposes other than electricity and in international co-operation on nuclear security and radiological protection was helping to renew world interest and demand for nuclear technology and equipment for multiple peaceful uses.

In short, the Committee must bear in mind that, in the light of current circumstances, restrictive and discriminatory policies on the part of suppliers would tend to be revived in regard to the provision of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. For that reason, efforts such as those undertaken by the Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), which had assumed less importance as a result of the availability of uranium and other material, should be resumed.

After having surmounted many problems, Mexico was, with the commencement of commercial operations at its nuclear power station at Laguna Verde, becoming a member of the group of States which were producing energy from nuclear sources. As a country committed to non-proliferation and in particular to the NPT, it had confirmed its decision to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes and under IAEA safeguards.

For developing countries such as Mexico, there was an urgent need for the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology without discrimination to be intensified in order to support national economic and social development efforts. The NPT, which offered an ideal framework in which to achieve that objective, had not been entirely able to fulfil its mission as a result of the lack of political will on the part of some suppliers to commit themselves to broad international co-operation programmes. Lack of external financing severely restricted the opportunities for many developing countries to continue with their nuclear energy projects.

The present Conference was the immediate predecessor of the 1995 Conference, at which a decision would have to be taken on the future of the Treaty. It was therefore all the more urgent for States Parties to fulfil their obligations. Total nuclear disarmament was the best means of ensuring non-proliferation and of guaranteeing that nuclear energy would be used solely for peaceful purposes. Fulfilment of the commitments emerging from the present Conference would provide a basis for strengthening the Treaty and effectively extending it into the coming century.

Mrs. EL TALLAWI (Egypt) said that her country attached considerable importance to the objective and purpose of article IV of the NPT; the peaceful use of nuclear technology was one of the main pillars of the Treaty and she therefore hoped that the final document would include practical and comprehensive recommendations on that aspect.

Referring to several matters already raised by her delegation at the previous Review Conference, she drew attention to the desirability of promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and of according preferential treatment to States Parties in facilitating the exchange of information, the technical capacity and the financial ability to develop peaceful nuclear programmes. Another aspect to be borne in mind was that the financial resources currently available to the IAEA in general and to its promotion and technical co-operation activities in particular were not

commensurate with its obligations arising out of the terms of the NPT. Such resources should therefore be significantly increased and, in that respect, her delegation's proposal in 1985 to set up a fund for that purpose should be reconsidered in the light of the current situation, in which nuclear technology had become essential in order to resolve many developmental problems and had proved its usefulness in agriculture, medicine, water desalination and measures to combat desertification. Indeed, the state of development of the developing countries meant that such advanced technology was essential in overcoming the crucial developmental problems that could not be solved by traditional means.

Another aspect raised in 1985 had been that of financing the nuclear power programmes of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. The matter should be pursued further and the Conference should find ways and means to overcome financing difficulties. At the same time, transparency with regard to the use of the results of scientific meetings of the IAEA should be promoted in order to make it possible for all concerned to use the latest developments in the field of nuclear technology, to collect information and set it out in a clear fashion so that decision-makers would become increasingly aware of the latest advances.

Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty having embarked upon peaceful nuclear programmes should have assurances that their programmes would not be endangered. Assurances should cover the danger of attack or threat of attack on safeguarded nuclear facilities; States Parties should, on request, provide assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties subjected to such an attack and States Parties should refrain from providing any sort of nuclear co-operation or assistance to any State which made an attack of that kind.

The IAEA had been successful in tackling the issue of the dumping of nuclear waste by means of guidelines which had been agreed by consensus and it was to be hoped that further progress would be made in that area. As to the CAS, her country had strongly supported its work and believed that it should not be terminated, even if there had been a change in the market, as it was still important to monitor the situation. She joined the representative of Mexico and other speakers who had spoken in favour of reactivating the work of that Committee. Lastly, on full-scope safeguards her delegation fully supported the proposal submitted by Australia.

Mr. WISBER LOEIS (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States, introduced the draft resolution, contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1, on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in relation with the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs and article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The draft resolution contained elements which reflected the position of the non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon States Parties in accordance with their priorities, needs and interests in international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In presenting the draft resolution the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties were sincerely committed to pursuing the objectives of the Treaty as stipulated in the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs. Recognition of all elements contained in the draft resolution would provide a strong impetus for effective implementation of the Treaty by, inter alia: eliminating the discriminatory practices exerted by some States Parties in providing assistance in the nuclear field to developing countries which were States Parties; terminating the supply of sensitive nuclear technology in contradiction with the spirit of article IV in relation to article I of the Treaty; further striving for the establishment of principles for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and reaffirming the role and activities of the IAEA in its promotional as well as regulatory endeavours.

In that respect, he drew attention to the terms of article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. The draft resolution brought into sharp focus matters for consideration during the present Conference. Adopting it would reaffirm the validity of article IV and thus strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the most widely acceptable non-proliferation régime.

Mr. ENDO (Japan) said that, in order to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and maintain and enhance its universality, it was essential to make adherence to it even more attractive by adopting specific measures. Two important areas should be considered in that respect: further promotion of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses, and reinforcement of export controls for nuclear-related materials.

In regard to the first area, the fact that there were over 140 States Parties to the Treaty indicated that it was one of the most widely accepted agreements. States had adhered to the Treaty in such large numbers not only because they were convinced that the NPT régime was indispensable in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons but also because the régime was

functioning well as a basic framework for promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan was keenly conscious of that fact and, as one of the most advanced countries in that area, was determined to continue to extend co-operation within that framework, as it had done over the previous five years.

International co-operation with the developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy took a variety of forms. Japan, for its part, placed emphasis on multilateral Government-to-Government co-operation through the IAEA as well as on bilateral co-operation, and had greatly increased its financial contributions. Japan's contribution to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in the fiscal year 1990 amounted to over \$5 million, or a little over 11 per cent of the Fund as a whole. That figure represented an increase by almost 200 per cent over the 1985 contribution. Resources allocated for technical assistance by the IAEA were, of course, modest, but compared with the IAEA budget's zero growth in other areas the increase was a substantial one.

Utilizing its advance nuclear technology, Japan had played a central role in financial and technological assistance to developing countries in Asia and the Pacific through the implementation of co-operation programmes of the Regional Co-operative Agreement, a form of co-operation which it greatly appreciated. Japan welcomed the recent establishment of a similar agreement for Africa and would demonstrate its great interest in the new scheme by attending the inaugural meeting to take place in Cairo on 4 September 1990. Japan would continue to contribute as much as possible towards the expansion and strengthening of multilateral co-operation through the IAEA.

As to the issue of preferential treatment raised by some participants in the Conference, his country shared, in principle, the view that some preferential treatment to States Parties would help to strengthen the NPT régime. On the other hand, he doubted whether preferential treatment would be compatible with the principle of equality among member States of international organizations, such as the IAEA. In his view, a policy of preferential treatment would hardly be applicable in the case of the IAEA, either from the legal or from the practical point of view. The Agency's Statute required that all member States, including those not parties to the NPT, should be treated on an equal footing; even if that stipulation did not exist, to expect States members of the IAEA that were not parties to the NPT to participate in a

consensus decision to adopt a policy which would operate to their detriment would be far from realistic. Speaking as the Chairman of the Board of Governors of IAEA, he did not think that the suggestion was practicable.

With regard to Japan's policy on exports of nuclear-related materials and equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States, it took strict measures to ensure that its co-operation in matters involving non-proliferation considerations was limited exclusively to those countries which had acceded to the NPT and had accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards. It wished that other exporting countries would take similarly strict measures. Furthermore, it saw a need for supplementary regulations to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and further strengthen the existing NPT régime. Such measures should not be intended to hamper exchanges in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; rather, they should facilitate international co-operation by further increasing mutual confidence among partners and motivate non-party States to accede to the Treaty. Lastly, with reference to the work of the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), the IAEA Board of Governors had just received that Committee's report, which would be forwarded to the Agency's General Conference to be held in September 1990.

Mr. TILEMANN (Australia) drew attention to the working paper his delegation, together with others, had submitted on article III (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.III/WP.1). He also welcomed the paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1), which contained many useful ideas and would doubtless stimulate substantive discussion in the Committee. In preparing for the present Conference, his delegation had taken as its starting point the final document of the previous Review Conference (NPT/CONF.III/64/I), which had contained a significant and balanced review of technical co-operation developments in the five-year period preceding 1985, along with recommendations for the future. Those recommendations had, by and large, been heeded. Levels of multilateral nuclear co-operation had generally risen, in some areas quite significantly. IAEA's funding mechanisms were clearly working to the advantage of developing countries. Bilateral and regional nuclear co-operation among States Parties had continued to expand, with few indications of any new or significant problems. The link between supply and non-proliferation conditions continued to be examined within the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). Although no concrete results had been achieved on principles, a new spirit of common endeavour appeared to be emerging. Recent discussions within CAS showed that the supply/demand

situation had in some respects improved, and that supply problems between Parties had generally been resolved rapidly and satisfactorily. While it was not convinced of the need for a resumption of formal CAS meetings, his delegation none the less agreed that the important changes taking place in the policies of both older and new suppliers might make a renewal of discussions on principles desirable.

As to some of the detailed proposals of the Third Review Conference relating to the Agency's technical assistance activities, indicative planning figures had been set to ensure continued adequate funding for the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund. New regional co-operation agreements had been established for Latin America and Africa, and the regional agreement for Asia and the Pacific had continued to expand its range of activities and to provide a valuable service to Parties in that region. A paper on activities under the Regional Co-operative Agreement for Asia and the Pacific would be submitted to the present Conference. Another recommendation of the Third Review Conference had been given effect in that multi-year, multi-donor projects were now a reality.

The Agency's evaluation capacity had developed, although more resources were needed to ensure that technical assistance funds were used as effectively as possible. The IAEA had examined the scope for facilitating funding of nuclear power projects, and was taking account of the study's findings in developing its own programmes. Regional seminars were being conducted with a view to developing understanding of the needs both of national energy authorities and of financial institutions. Lastly, greater attention had been given to addressing the needs of the least developed countries, and his delegation would continue to work towards further enhancing that effort.

The Agency's background paper on article IV (NPT/CONF.IV/13) gave a balanced and helpful account of IAEA's technical assistance activities since the Third Review Conference. The improved flow of funds and the continuing strength of the commitment of NPT Parties to giving preferential treatment to other States Parties were best demonstrated in the record of footnote a/ projects. The IAEA continued to be the most important multilateral institution within the scope of article IV of the Treaty. Its activities in that field had shown that it was sensitive to the interests of all the member States, the overwhelming majority of which were Parties to the NPT. That point should be clearly reflected in the final document.

There were, of course, other avenues of technical co-operation, both multilateral and bilateral. In the multilateral field, an important role was being played by such United Nations bodies as UNDP, FAO and WHO, as well as by non-governmental bodies, institutes and industry groups which helped to create a stable environment for nuclear co-operation. The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) was an important recent example. However, bilateral nuclear co-operation probably remained the single most important ingredient in world-wide nuclear co-operation activities. There had been a slump in demand for nuclear reactors, but the volume of co-operation worldwide and the range of power and non-power applications continued to expand. Australia had continued to play a full part in nuclear co-operation. It had maintained its contributions to TACF and was a major contributor to the Asia-Pacific RCA. It had bilateral nuclear co-operation programmes with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. It continued to be a major supplier of uranium for nuclear power generation, having exported 20,000 tons since the previous Review Conference under bilateral safeguards arrangements covering 20 States Parties to the Treaty. The agreements in question, which complemented IAEA safeguards and NPT objectives, had operated smoothly to the full satisfaction of all concerned. Australia also had bilateral arrangements covering other forms of nuclear technology, including the technology of disposal of high-level fuel-cycle waste products.

In its bilateral co-operation, his country adhered to a policy of strict preference for NPT Parties and also took carefully into account its obligations under articles II and III of the Treaty. Like those of other States Parties, Australia's activities were conditioned first and foremost by the existence of adequate safeguards against the diversion of transferred items for use in nuclear weapons or explosives. That issue would be examined fully in Main Committee II. Australia's international nuclear dealings also relied heavily on multilateral efforts to respond to the interrelated concerns of safety and environment. He welcomed the substantial international effort to alleviate the effects of the Chernobyl accident and eliminate the possibility of any recurrence, and also the IAEA's response to the Brundtland report. Similarly, he supported the continued focus of IAEA programmes directly aimed at ensuring that the nuclear power industry should remain as environmentally sound as possible and at developing nuclear techniques for use

in addressing environmental problems. Equally gratifying was the Agency's consideration of a code of practice for the transboundary movement of nuclear materials and waste and its contribution to the development of safety and other guidelines and to the consideration of nuclear liability issues, matters which were central to the nuclear industry and to the exchange of technology.

Mr. RASHID (Bangladesh) said that many of the elements crucial to the implementation of article IV had already been mentioned by the representative of Egypt, as well as by the representative of Indonesia in presenting the draft resolution of the Group of Non-Aligned States (NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1). His delegation fully supported the draft resolution and hoped that it would be favourably received by the Committee.

The Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference had stressed the need for technology transfer and promotional co-operation between States Parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Transfer of technology in that field could contribute to the elimination of existing technical and economic gaps between developed and developing countries. Unfortunately, however, the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear applications were not reaching the developing countries among the Parties to the NPT. There was a growing feeling that some incentives should be accorded to the NPT developing countries so as to make the Treaty more attractive to other developing countries that were not parties to it. The non-proliferation régime could be strengthened only through universalization of the Treaty, and it was therefore essential to secure more accessions by granting preferential treatment to developing States Parties. The development aspect of the Treaty should be realized to the fullest extent and expenditures on technical co-operation should be comparable to the level of expenditures on safeguards activities. Clearly, the developed countries must do their utmost to enable the NPT developing countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In the view of his delegation, article IV should encompass co-operation in all energy areas, and not just in the field of nuclear energy. In order to run a nuclear power facility, a country needed a sizeable electrical grid, experience in handling complex energy systems and back-up electricity sources in the event of unforeseen circumstances forcing a shut-down. Many developing countries, in particular the least developed, were unable to meet their electricity needs, and it was therefore essential to give broad assistance to the NPT developing countries in improving their energy systems so that they

could reap the full benefits of nuclear energy. In that context, his delegation intended to submit a proposal for incorporation in the draft resolution contained in document NPT/CONF.IV/L.2 and Corr.1.

Mr. IONESCU (Romania) said that his country had adopted a programme to promote the use of nuclear energy for the generation of electricity and for non-energy purposes. It had concluded bilateral agreements on the transfer of equipment, materials and technology, was implementing safeguards and had taken measures to prevent proliferation.

Romania received technical assistance from the IAEA, which was to be congratulated on its efforts during the period under review, and had benefited from international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, within the framework of the NPT. An Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) had been sent to evaluate a nuclear plant under construction; a Waste Management Advisory Programme (WAMAP) mission had examined radioactive waste disposal; and a Radiation Protection Advisory Team (RAPAT) had looked into questions relating to radiation protection. In June 1990, agreements had been reached with the Agency on the transfer of low-enriched fuels for a safeguarded research reactor in Romania.

In view of the positive developments in international relations, actual prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as the major objective supported by most States, should be achieved by means of co-operation between partners engaged in a joint endeavour. It was necessary to work towards enhancing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, expanding international co-operation in that area and improving the safety of nuclear power plants in operation or under construction. All States Parties to the Treaty must have better access to safeguarded nuclear energy and technology transfer. Greater support must be given to the Agency's technical assistance missions, and the use of nuclear techniques must be stepped up in industry, agriculture, medicine and other sectors. The nuclear materials recovered in the disarmament process must be recycled for peaceful uses in non-nuclear-weapon States. Lastly, the Conference must consider ways of protecting nuclear facilities from attack and ensure that its conclusions on that question were reflected in the final document.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.